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Anger plays a central role in politics and previous studies have consistently 
underlined its mobilization effect. Anger has also been the most widespread 
emotional reaction to the economic crisis, but the aftermath of the crisis suggests 
that disengagement, rather than mobilization, has emerged as the dominant effect 
of anger. In order to address the seeming contradiction, this study explores the 
impact of anger about the economic crisis on political attitudes and behavior with 
the 2005-2010 British election panel study. Findings show that the impact of anger 
about the crisis – which has a systemic nature, leads to diffuse blame attribution 
and makes retribution harder – is conditional on individual efficacy, i.e. perception 
of individual political influence and resources: anger decreases political attention 
and participation among citizens with low efficacy, while it stimulates greater 
political engagement among citizens with high efficacy. At the same time, anger 
about the economic crisis has fueled support for anti-system parties, thanks to their 
refusal to compromise and the increased risk propensity of angry citizens. Sections 
on predicted probability of vote and party choice further explore the impact of 
anger, while causal mediation analysis tests the causal mechanisms suggested by 
the theory.   
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The recent economic and financial crisis has caused a deterioration in the economic conditions 
of many residents. Both in Europe and the US, millions of citizens have lost their jobs, undergone 
severe pay cuts and lost their homes because of inability to pay mortgages. The crisis has threatened 
their way of life and, among the emotional reactions, one has emerged as the most common response: 
anger.1 How does anger about the financial crisis affect citizens’ political attitudes and participation? 
Studies focusing on emotions have consistently shown a link between anger and mobilization. 
Cognitive appraisal theories of emotions explain that anger stimulates problem-focused coping, 
leading individuals to attack the source of their distress (see Lazarus 1991, Frijda 1986, Smith et al. 
2008). Both equity theory (e.g. Adams 1965, Walster et al. 1978) and recent experimental studies 
(Van Zomeren et al. 2012; Van Zomeren et al. 2008) show that anger emerging from the appraisal of 
injustice promotes action to redress the unfairness. Studies on election campaigns also find that anger 
stimulates mobilization more than other emotions (Valentino et al. 2011, Weber 2013). 
The aftermath of the economic and financial crisis, however, seems to point in the opposite 
direction. On the one hand, many citizens have turned away from politics, as the low voter turnout 
registered in many European countries in recent elections illustrates. Political disaffection has grown 
in many sectors of society and traditional participation decreased. Disengagement, rather than 
mobilization, has often emerged as the dominant effect of anger about the financial crisis. On the 
other hand, support for populist forces and anti-system parties has increased (e.g. Bosco and Verney 
2012). How can we explain the contrast between findings in the literature and recent events? 
In order to account for this seeming contradiction, we need to consider the type of anger 
developed in the context of the crisis and variation in individual-level responses. The systemic nature 
of anger about the crisis has led individuals to cast blame on the entire political-economic system and 
                                                          
1 A poll conducted by USA Today/Gallup in late September 2008 found that a majority of Americans (53%) were angry 
about the financial crisis, while fewer Americans (41%) felt afraid: http://www.gallup.com/poll/110914/majority-
americans-angry-about-financial-crisis.aspx. Three years later, in October 2011, 60% of respondents in a survey of the 
Chicago Booth/Kellogg School Financial Trust Index reported that they were angry or very angry about the economic 
condition. That was the highest level of anger registered by the Index since the beginning of the financial crisis. For the 
report, see: http://www.financialtrustindex.org/resultswave12.htm.  
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made retribution harder. This has produced a demobilizing effect on the half of the population with 
low political efficacy, i.e. low perceived influence over politics: among these citizens, anger has 
diminished political attention and electoral participation. On the other hand, anger has increased 
participation in the fourth of the population with the highest levels of efficacy. Indeed, anger, 
accompanied by a sense of injustice and a desire for change, sparks the motivation to act; beliefs on 
the availability of resources, then, shapes the perceived feasibility of change, thereby generating 
alternative responses. At the same time, anger has fueled support for anti-establishment parties. The 
success of anti-system forces is explained by their refusal to compromise with the elite in power, 
which goes well with the systemic nature of anger and the diffuse blame attribution; and by the 
increased risk propensity of angry citizens in search of fundamental change.  
By exploring the political effects of anger about the economic crisis, this study offers several 
contributions to the literature on emotions and political participation. First, it challenges previous 
studies maintaining that anger unconditionally promotes mobilization. Instead, the effect of anger is 
influenced by the nature of this emotion and the perception of personal political resources. Second, 
causal mediation analysis shows that anger diminishes attention to politics by depressing political 
trust, rather than promoting reliance on heuristics. Furthermore, by linking anger to political 
preferences and testing the causal mechanisms behind the anger-induced support for anti-system 
parties, this study investigates which political actors and why benefit from the diffusion of anger.  
The analysis of the impact of anger on citizens’ political engagement addresses a central issue 
of the democratic life, which becomes even more urgent if one considers that widespread anger about 
economic hardship provoked serious challenges to political systems in the past. To run the analysis, 
I use the British Election Study, a nine-wave panel survey conducted between 2005 and 2010. The 
panel character of the dataset allows this work to address endogeneity concerns that often affect 
survey data dealing with emotions. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, the study 
summarizes previous contributions from the literature on the effects of emotions on behavior and 
political participation. Second, it outlines the impact of systemic anger about the crisis on political 
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attention, participation and support for anti-system parties, exploring individual variation in 
responses. Third, it explains the choice of the data and presents the findings of the analysis, with 
sections on causal mediation and predicted probability of vote and party choice. In the end, it 
considers the implications of the findings and suggests promising paths for future research.  
 
Emotions, Behavior and Political Participation 
 Individual political participation can vary significantly over time. The same citizen may 
decide to cast a ballot at one election and abstain from voting in the following one, or to participate 
in a demonstration and not join later rallies. The literature on political participation has for a long 
time emphasized the importance of demographic characteristics and structural factors,2 but these 
stable characteristics do not help us understand variation over time in individual-level responses. To 
understand these fluctuations we need to examine short-term motivations, and in this, emotions play 
an important role (Valentino et al. 2011). Anger, specifically, takes on such centrality in politics that 
“one can define [it] as the essential political emotion” (Lyman, 1981: 61; see also Ost 2004). This is 
because anger is often linked to competition (e.g. Mackie et al. 2000, Cottrell and Neuberg 2005, 
Cuddy et al. 2007) and politics involves competition over resources. For instance, in the context of 
social movements, anger matters politically because it facilitates mobilization and sustains conflict 
(Jasper 2011; see also Holmes 2004). 
Studies in political science exploring the effects of emotions on citizens’ behavior have 
initially distinguished between positive and negative emotions. Affective Intelligence Theory 
maintains that positive emotions like enthusiasm activate the dispositional system: they emerge when 
goals are being met and reinforce traditional patterns of behavior. Negative emotions, instead, emerge 
as a result of a threat from the environment. They activate the surveillance system and stimulate new 
                                                          
2 For instance, the basic resource model (BRM) of participation (see Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) includes age, 
education, income and other demographics. The civic voluntarism model proposed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
(1995) includes indicators of civic skills acquired outside of politics in addition to the variables offered by the BRM. For 
a concise summary on the point see Valentino et al. (2011). 
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information seeking, since traditional habits have proved ill-suited to deal with the threat (Marcus et 
al. 2000). More recently, scholars have explored the specific effects of different negative emotions. 
MacKuen et al. (2010) maintain that aversion, which includes feelings of anger and disgust, has a 
negative effect on information seeking and desire to learn: “With aversion, one habituated practice is 
avoidance – rejecting distasteful news much in the way that one spits out a bite of a rotten apple” 
(442). This is because aversion – similarly to positive emotions – activates the disposition rather than 
the surveillance system, which in turn leads people to rely on traditional habits. Consistently, an 
experimental study on emotions and political learning has shown that only anxiety increases the 
quality and quantity of information seeking, while anger depresses search for novel information 
(Valentino et al. 2008). These results confirm previous findings illustrating how anxiety boosts 
careful information seeking, while anger leads people to rely on cognitive heuristics (Tiedens & 
Linton 2001).3  
In psychology, cognitive appraisal theories of emotions explain that the emergence of 
different emotions is influenced by the assessment of the situation and the relation between the 
individual and the environment. Alternative negative emotions emerge in different contexts: anger 
develops when individuals can identify the cause of a threat with enough certainty, while anxiety 
derives from incertitude about the origin of the threat (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Additionally, anger 
is more likely to arise when people feel in control of the situation and confident about their ability to 
eliminate the cause of their distress (Lazarus 1991 and Frijda 1986, cited in Berkowitz and Harmon-
Jones 2004). More recent experimental studies, however, suggest that coping is not a necessary 
mechanism for anger to arise. Indeed, even people who feel powerless and unable to eliminate the 
source of their distress can experience anger (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004, Harmon-Jones, 
Sigelman, Bohlig, and Harmon-Jones 2003).4  
                                                          
3 Some recent work, however, has shown that anger increases information seeking significantly more than anxiety 
when additional information is perceived as useful for retribution (Ryan 2012). 
4 As it will become apparent below, this seems to be the case in Europe during the crisis, when the frustration derived 
from the inability to remove the actors blamed for the crisis arguably fueled even deeper anger. 
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Cognitive appraisal theories of emotions also suggest that individuals take alternative patterns 
of actions in order to cope with the negative emotions arising from the situation (Lazarus 1991, Frijda 
1986, Folkman et al. 1986). In particular, anger stimulates problem-focused coping. Since angry 
individuals do not accept the negative situation as inevitable, they attack the source of their anger to 
eliminate it; this course of action is facilitated by their more optimistic stance on the possibility to 
remove the threatening source (Lazarus 1991, Smith et al. 2008).5 Given that the sense of control 
favors more optimistic risk assessments, anger also enhances risk-seeking behavior (Lerner and 
Keltner 2000, 2001). Indeed, a study on opinions about the Iraq War found that anger increased 
support for the war because of risk underestimation (Huddy et al. 2007). More generally, recent work 
in political science has shown that anger stimulates mobilization more than anxiety and enthusiasm 
(Valentino et al. 2011). During election campaigns, anger generates political engagement by 
increasing factors positively related to participation (Weber 2013).  
  
The Impact of Anger about the Economic Crisis on Political Engagement 
As outlined above, the implications of anger on learning and behavior are multifaceted. Anger 
usually discourages search for new information, encourages problem-focused coping with the goal to 
remove the source of one’s distress, and promotes risk-seeking behavior by favoring risk 
underestimation. Within this framework, studies in political science have generally assumed an 
unconditional mobilizing effect of anger, regardless of its nature and individual characteristics. Do 
these findings apply to anger about the economic crisis? In particular, how do we reconcile the anger-
induced mobilization effect, which is a consistent finding in the literature, with the empirical 
widespread political disengagement? In order to address these questions, we need to consider the type 
of anger that has developed in the context of the crisis.   
                                                          
5 See Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004) for a summary on this point. 
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Anger about the economic crisis is characterized by its systemic nature, in which blame 
attribution – which normally accompanies anger – is cast upon the entire political-economic system. 
Indeed, “anger is the emotion central to politics, both as a diffuse, untargeted sentiment citizens 
experience, and as the emotion political organizers need to capture and channel, which they do by 
offering up an ‘enemy’ they identify as the source of the problem” (Ost 2004, 231). Previous work in 
political science has usually focused on the latter type, analyzing the effect of anger towards specific 
political targets, including candidates or incumbents, and specific policies.6 In the case of the crisis, 
however, anger emerges as a diffuse and systemic emotional reaction in response to a broader event.  
 Both at the expert and the ordinary citizen level, responsibility for the crisis has often been 
attributed to the entire political-economic establishment, rather than single political actors. A survey 
conducted among financial-crisis authors and experts between 2011 and 2014 revealed that an 
overwhelming majority believed that “everyone was at fault” for the crisis in the US, rather than just 
“Wall Street” or “the government”.7 Analogously, a 2013 October editorial piece in The Washington 
Post criticized a $13 billion civil settlement with J.P. Morgan because the settlement 
disproportionately cast the blame on the bank, when instead “everyone, from Wall Street to Main 
Street to Washington, acted on widely held economic beliefs that turned out not to be true.”8  
 Ordinary people, too, have often hold the entire system accountable. In Europe, citizens have 
blamed globalization-related factors, i.e. the international system as a whole, including international 
investors, foreign governments, and international institutions such as the EU (Fernández-Albertos, 
Kuo and Balcells 2013). In the UK, an overwhelming majority (86%) considered the entire economic-
financial system, represented by the banks, responsible for the crisis. Citizens have usually blamed 
more than one actor, indicating the national government, the US government, mortgage holders and 
                                                          
6 Items in the American National Election Study usually measure individuals’ emotional reactions towards specific 
political figures or candidates and policies. 
7 See Investor Home, “The Global Financial Crisis Experts Survey,” also reported by The New Republic, 9 May 2014: 
http://investorhome.com/gfc/.  
8 “Making a bad example of JPMorgan Chase.” The Washington Post, 23 October 2013. 
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others as responsible for the crisis, in addition to the banks (see Wagner 2013). This data suggests 
that the ubiquity of the crisis and its international nature convinced people that a systemic 
configuration, rather than isolated actors, made the crisis possible. 
 Angry people are enlivened by a desire for retribution (see Druckman and McDermott 2008) 
to punish the source of their distress, but retribution becomes harder in the case of systemic anger. In 
such a context, punishing a single actor like the incumbent is usually not a satisfying option. Instead, 
if the establishment as a whole is to blame, a more fundamental reshaping of the political-economic 
landscape in which the crisis originated is required. This demanding enterprise calls for skills and 
resources that are not readily available to everyone in the general population. Hence, citizens yearning 
for change ask: is concrete change possible? I maintain that the perception of the possibility of change 
depends on the resources that a citizen believes to possess. Anger, accompanied by a sense of injustice 
and a desire for change, sparks the motivation to act; beliefs on the availability of resources, then, 
shape perceptions about the feasibility of change. Indeed, recent work focusing on individual 
psychological orientations has shown that motivation alone is not sufficient for participation; 
resources and opportunities are necessary complements (Kam 2012: 829).9 Therefore, I hypothesize, 
the effect of anger is conditional on political efficacy.  
In the case of low political efficacy, change often does not look feasible and anger leads to 
demobilization. Citizens angry at a system that they believe they cannot effectively change are likely 
to distance themselves from the environment that is causing their distress. More specifically, I 
hypothesize that anger leads to decreased attention to politics among citizens with low efficacy. 
Previous work has found that aversion, which includes feelings of anger and disgust, has a negative 
effect on information seeking (see MacKuen et al. 2010). I qualify this finding by restricting it to 
citizens with low efficacy: 
                                                          
9 Kam has shown that risk orientation predicts future political participation better than past actual participation. She 
explains: “This finding supports the notion that wanting to participate matters, but motivation alone is not sufficient 
to bring about actual participation. In order to participate, people need resources and opportunities to participate as 
well” (Kam 2012, 829). 
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H1: Anger about the economic crisis decreases attention to politics among citizens with low efficacy. 
 
In this context, the key mechanism linking anger to decreased information seeking is different 
from what the literature has often suggested. Rather than reliance on habits and cognitive heuristics, 
I propose that it is the anger-induced distrust in the political system that causes people to pay less 
attention to politics. Indeed, trust decreases support for and satisfaction with political leaders, 
incumbent and candidates (Hetherington 1998, Sigelman et al. 1992). In the context of the crisis, 
because of the anger-induced distrust, citizens are not willing to lend an ear to a despised political 
system that is no longer considered a source of reliable political information:10 
 
H2: The anger-induced distrust explains the lower attention to politics among citizens with low 
efficacy. 
 
 As a consequence of this decreased attention to politics, I also expect anger to lead to 
decreased political participation in the case of low efficacy. Given that anger diminishes attention to 
politics and lower interest is traditionally associated with lower participation, anger will depress 
participation in the political arena. Furthermore, the combination of anger and low efficacy is 
expected to reduce political participation also by making a problem-focused copying mechanism not 
viable. Angry citizens who have lost interest in politics, do not feel represented in the political system, 
and do not believe they can bring change decide to disengage from politics. Therefore, I challenge 
the consistent finding in the literature suggesting a link between anger and mobilization and – in the 
case of systemic anger – I advocate for a more nuanced approach taking into account individual 
variation: 
  
H3: Anger about the economic crisis decreases political participation among citizens with low 
efficacy. 
 
                                                          
10 My prediction is therefore different from what hypothesized by Chan (1997), who maintains that low levels of trust 
increase attention to campaign among the more educated. 
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 On citizens with high efficacy, instead, anger produces opposite effects, leading to 
mobilization and higher political engagement. Indeed, not only are angry citizens with high efficacy 
enlivened by a desire for change and retribution; they also believe they have the resources necessary 
to influence politics and bring about change. When citizens feel empowered, anger sparks the 
motivation to take action. It is therefore the combination of perceived resources and strong motivation 
that favors mobilization and participation. Therefore, the problem-focused coping stimulated by 
anger will lead angry citizens with high levels of efficacy to get engaged in the political arena in order 
to change what they dislike:  
 
H4: Anger about the economic crisis increases political participation among citizens with high 
efficacy. 
 
Figure 1: Effect of anger on participation conditional on efficacy 
 
Anger about the Economic Crisis and Anti-Political Establishment (APE) parties 
As explained above, the effect of anger about the economic crisis on political participation is 
conditional on efficacy. However, this is only half of the story. In fact, even individuals who are less 
likely to go to the polls still harbor political preferences. Citizens who are currently demobilized 
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constitute a pool of potential voters, who could be mobilized in the future should their preferred 
political alternatives emerge as electorally credible contenders. In order to understand the potential 
longer-term effects of anger on electoral behavior we need therefore to analyze the political 
preferences of angry citizens. What is the impact of anger, then, on citizens’ party preferences? The 
systemic nature of anger about the crisis, and the related diffuse blame attribution, makes angry 
citizens more sensitive to the appeals of actors who present themselves as anti-system forces and 
emerge as a possibility of fundamental change. Anti-political establishment parties (APE) are 
therefore well positioned to meet the demands of angry citizens. Political parties are classified as APE 
based on the following criteria: they raise challenges to the status quo both in terms of major policy 
issues and political system issues; perceive themselves as a challenge to all the parties that form the 
political establishment; and maintain that there exists a fundamental divide between the people and 
the political establishment as a whole, with no difference between the government and the opposition 
(Abedi and Lundberg 2009; see also Schedler 1996 and Abedi 2004).11 
Two factors explain why APE parties can build support among citizens angry about the 
economic crisis. First, their refusal to compromise with the elite in power capitalizes on angry 
individuals’ reduced willingness to compromise12 and makes retribution and punishment of the entire 
establishment look possible, which goes well with the systemic nature of anger about the economic 
crisis. As Schedler has explained, “‘[a]ntipolitical-establishment parties describe one specific conflict 
as society’s fundamental cleavage: the conflict between the ‘ruled’ and the ‘rulers’” (1996, 294). 
Therefore, APE parties try to build support by presenting themselves as opposed to both the 
incumbent and the mainstream opposition; in their appeals, government and opposition are presented 
as colluders of an undifferentiated political class (Barr 2009, 32; Rydgren 2005, 427). By presenting 
themselves as opposed to the entire establishment that led to the crisis and therefore offering a path 
                                                          
11 Some examples of APE parties that have increased their consensus in Europe during the crisis include the National 
Front in France, Golden Dawn and Syriza in Greece, the Five Star Movement in Italy, and the UKIP in the UK. 
12 Indeed, as a consequence of depressed exposure to novel information and biased information-seeking (MacKuen et 
al. 2010), aversion – which includes anger and disgust – leads to reduced willingness to compromise. 
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for retribution against the elite system as a whole, APE parties satisfy the demands of angry citizens 
casting blame diffusely and invoking systemic change. 
Second, risk-seeking helps explain the link between anger and support for APE parties. As a 
matter of fact, anger induces risk-seeking behavior. Recent work on individual risk orientation has 
suggested that risk propensity leads to greater support for challenger candidates, characterized by 
uncertainty and change (Kam and Simas 2012; see also Eckles et al. 2014). Anti-establishment 
parties, specifically, represent a particularly risky and uncertain choice because they challenge the 
status quo, propose dramatic changes with unpredictable outcomes, and are often new actors who 
have little familiarity with government responsibility. Angry citizens who have become less risk 
averse, therefore, are more likely to support this option: 
 
H5: Anger about the economic crisis increases support for anti-political establishment parties. 
 
H6: Desire for fundamental change, which entails risky choices and refusal to compromise, explains 
the anger-induced support for APE parties. 
 
Risk-seeking also helps explain why APE parties have the potential to succeed even, or even 
more, among demobilized citizens with low efficacy. Indeed, angry individuals with fewer resources, 
who have been pushed at the margins of the political system, feel they have little to lose, given their 
perceived inability to change the system from within. They become therefore more willing to embrace 
the risky option represented by anti-system parties. Furthermore, APE parties often adopt populist 
stances,13 which celebrate the people and their authenticity as opposed to the elites (Stanley 2008). 
Ordinariness becomes a virtue to contrast with the corruption of the establishment and marginalized 
citizens feel empowered by appeals targeted to outsiders: a path towards change seems to open for 
ordinary people with few resources. Hence, I hypothesize that:    
 
H7: The support for anti-political establishment parties will be higher among angry citizens with low 
efficacy. 
                                                          
13 Populist messages often contain anti-establishment appeals. See Barr 2009, 38-39. 
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Context and Data: The UK, the 2010 Election and the UKIP 
The recent economic crisis offers a good opportunity to explore the impact of systemic anger 
on citizens’ attitudes towards politics. The economic crisis has emerged as a threat, caused a 
deterioration in the economic conditions of many citizens and stimulated negative emotions such as 
anger and fear (Wagner 2013).14 In Europe, the deep social distress that followed the crisis led to the 
growth of populist and anti-system forces in several countries. In order to test the hypotheses above, 
I use the 2010 British Election Study (BES). 2010 is a good time to test the effect of anger about the 
financial and economic crisis because at that time the impact of the crisis became fully apparent 
throughout Europe. Indeed, 2009 was the annus horribilis for most European economies, with severe 
negative growth, increasing deficit and quickly growing unemployment rate. By the following year, 
citizens were fully aware of the negative consequences of the economic turmoil and the financial 
crisis dominated election campaigns across Europe.  
The UK also offers a hard test for my theory. The economic recession and the resulting 
widespread discontent were central issues in the political life of the country (Curtice and Fisher 2011), 
but the crisis and the related anger were arguably not as deep as they were in most southern European 
countries. Therefore, if the predicted political effects of anger emerge in the British context, they are 
likely to be amplified in the European countries where anger ran deeper. As for support for APE 
parties, the UK adopts single-member plurality in national elections, i.e. an electoral system that often 
penalizes third or protest parties.15 If the prediction linking anger to support for anti-system parties is 
                                                          
14 Wagner (2013) has shown that angry and fearful reactions to the economic crisis in the UK varied depending on 
blame attribution, with anger emerging among citizens who blamed accountable political actors, such as the national 
government and the European Union, for the crisis. The link between anger about the economic crisis and blame 
attribution to political actors confirms the importance of exploring the political implications of anger about the crisis.  
15 One may argue that citizens are more prone to vote for APE parties in a single-member plurality system as a protest 
vote because of the very low chance for such parties to win the seat and the consequent low risk involved. However, 
this claim is not very convincing in the case of angry people. First, as explained above, angry individuals usually display 
a copying-focused behavior to eliminate the source of their distress. They act to change what they do not like, rather 
than just expressing discontent. As a result, angry citizens are expected to be more likely to vote for APE parties in 
contexts where they think the parties have a real chance to succeed and bring change. Second, the fact that more risk 
Gabriele Magni 
13 
 
confirmed despite the unfavorable electoral system, we can be more confident about the possibility 
for the findings to travel to political contexts in which proportional representation may facilitate the 
electoral success of APE parties.16 In the British context, one political force offers a telling example 
of APE parties: the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The UKIP promotes a populist, 
anti-politician message that expresses dissatisfaction with all the mainstream political forces and aims 
to recruit protest voters by branding itself as the “real opposition.” Furthermore, it advocates a major 
policy change, i.e. the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, and has raised major 
challenges to the political system by calling for the repeal of the Human Rights Act and the 
dismantling of regional assemblies (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts 2012, Abedi and Lundberg 2009).17  
The British Election Study offers several advantages because it contains panel data with nine 
waves of surveys conducted between the 2005 and the 2010 election. Panel data raise fewer concerns 
about causal direction and endogeneity between emotions, on the one hand, and political attention, 
participation and preferences, on the other.18 The panel nature of the dataset allows me to control for 
participation and support for APE parties before the crisis and evaluate how anger about the crisis 
has modified patterns of political behavior and electoral choice. Moreover, survey data from the 
British elections nicely complement the existing literature on the political effects of anger, which has 
often been conducted in experimental settings19 in the context of American politics. This study, which 
                                                          
is involved in PR systems, since APE parties could actually win seats, should not discourage angry people from 
expressing their preference for these parties, given that anger usually induces risk-seeking behavior. 
16 Different elections in the UK suggest that the electoral system influences the electoral results of APE parties, with 
PR systems favoring their success. For instance, in national elections conducted with a plurality system, the UKIP – the 
best example of APE party, as described below – won 2.3% of the total votes in 2005 and 3.1% of the vote in 2010. In 
both cases, the UKIP failed to win any parliamentary seats. In the elections for the European Parliament, which are 
conducted under a PR system, the UKIP won 16.1% of the votes in 2004 and 16.5% in 2010. 
17 It is certainly true that the UKIP has an ideological bent towards the right and, as a result, offers a more attractive 
opportunity for protest vote to the conservative electorate. However, this point does not weaken the theoretical 
claims of this study. To the contrary, the theory gains even more plausibility if the study can prove that angry voters 
are more likely in general to support the UKIP regardless of their party identification. Indeed, if this is the case, the 
effect of anger on party choice is so strong that it is detected even after controlling for ideological preferences.  
18 This is a concern raised by some authors about cross-sectional data: “Do emotions produce information seeking or 
do those who seek information experience strong emotions as a result?” (Valentino et al. 2008, 252). Since a question 
on feelings about the economic crisis was asked in the 2010 pre-campaign wave, I can observe how anger influenced 
later interest and participation both during the campaign and at the election, as captured by following waves.  
19 For an exception, see Valentino et al. (2011), who conjugate experimental and observational data from U.S. 
elections. 
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explores the effects of anger naturally experienced in response to a serious threat like the economic 
crisis, offers increased external validity by focusing on a different geographical context. 
 
Testing the Hypotheses 
A preliminary analysis reveals that anger has been the dominant emotional reaction to the 
crisis. Indeed, anger about the economic conditions of the country has increased substantially among 
British citizens since the beginning of the crisis. In 2005, before the crisis unfolded, only 13% of the 
respondents expressed anger about the general economic situation; five years later, in the middle of 
the financial crisis, the percentage had increased to almost 50% of the sample.20 Among the negative 
emotions potentially related to the crisis, anger has emerged as a reaction more common than fear, 
with about half of the sample expressing anger about the crisis, as compared to less than one third of 
the respondents who reported fear. While individuals expressing fear increased from 17 to 32.5% 
between 2005 and 2010, anger jumped from 13 to 46%. This widespread diffusion of anger calls for 
an analysis of its implications on political attitudes and behavior.  
 
Figure 2: Anger about the general economic situation 
 
                                                          
20 The question asked in the survey reads: “Which, if any, of the following words describe your feelings about the 
country’s general economic situation?” 
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Anger and low efficacy 
To measure the effect of anger about the economic crisis on attention to politics, I observe 
how anger influenced citizens’ attention to the 2010 election campaign,21 measured on a 10-point 
scale.22 The main independent variable is anger about the financial crisis, which is a dummy obtained 
from the 2010 pre-campaign wave.23 Anger enters the equation also in interaction with efficacy, 
which measures individuals’ confidence in their ability to influence politics and public affairs. Since 
the anger coefficient corresponds to the effect of anger on individuals with no efficacy, for whom the 
interaction term is eliminated, I expect this coefficient to be negative: anger is predicted to depress 
political attention in case of low efficacy. Several controls are introduced to isolate the impact of 
anger. In addition to demographic covariates, I control for people’s general interest and attention to 
politics, because these two factors likely influence how much attention individuals paid specifically 
to the 2010 campaign.24 Accounting for general political predisposition, thus, allows me to gauge 
                                                          
21 Two reasons explain why I chose attention to the 2010 election campaign as the dependent variable, rather than 
more general measures of interest or attention to politics. First, this is a more specific question that should better 
capture respondents’ attitudes at the time when it is asked. A question on general interest in politics may instead 
induce respondents to give an average answer on their interest over time. Therefore, by choosing the more specific 
option, I can better capture the specific effect of anger in the context of the crisis. Second, this study explores the 
implication of anger on traditional participation. A question about the 2010 election campaign best captures this 
concept. Indeed, an angry citizen may preserve a general interest in politics even when she is turned away from 
traditional participation. A list with the survey questions from which the variables are operationalized can be found in 
the appendix. 
22 Since the values of the variable are spread across its entire range (see histogram of the distribution of the 
dependent variable in the appendix), I estimate an OLS model. An ordered categorical model with the same controls, 
which produced essentially similar results, can be found in the appendix. 
23 The independent variable of interest, i.e. anger, is measured in the pre-campaign wave, while the dependent 
variable attention to politics is measured in the campaign-period wave. The temporal priority of the measure of anger, 
therefore, helps address endogeneity concerns (e.g., are people who don’t pay attention to politics more likely to feel 
anger?). As explained below, a robustness check (model 5) further addresses endogeneity concerns by controlling for 
attention paid to campaigns before the crisis. 
24 This is, admittedly, a hard test for my hypothesis since general interest in politics is presumably strongly correlated 
to the attention displayed in the 2010 election campaign. General interest in politics is a relevant control because it 
captures habitual engagement in politics. Since this study considers emotions, which play an important role in short-
term motivations, it is important to control for the individual background in terms of political interest, against which 
emotions may explain variation in interest and participation over time. However, out of concern of very high 
correlation between general interest in politics and the dependent variable attention to the campaign, I also ran a 
model without general interest as a control, which can be found in the appendix. As shown in the appendix, the 
coefficient of anger is still statistically significant and very similar in terms of size. However, the R2 of the model 
without general interest decreases considerably. Since general interest explains a significant part of the variation in 
the dependent variable, excluding it may lead to omitted variable issues. For this reason, general interest in politics is 
maintained as a control in the main models presented in the paper. 
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how the impact of anger about the financial crisis has modified citizens’ attention to politics. Two 
additional political indicators are plugged into the basic model: strength of party identification and 
party contact during the campaign, since strong partisans and citizens who interact with candidates 
are more likely to pay greater attention.  
Four additional models test the robustness of the findings. Model 2 considers the possibly 
non-linear effect of age on political attention.25 Given that anger has often emerged among citizens 
who held the government 
responsible for the crisis 
(Wagner 2013), model 3 
verifies that anger is not just 
a proxy for blame attribution. 
Model 4 controls for fear 
about the crisis, in order to 
isolate the effect of anger 
within the more general 
category of negative 
emotions. Thanks to the 
panel character of the data, 
the last model controls for the 
degree of attention paid to the 
2005 election campaign, i.e. 
before the development of 
the crisis and the diffusion of 
anger.26 
                                                          
25 Studies have found that middle-aged individuals are more politically engaged than both younger and older citizens. 
26 Model 5 was estimated with robust standard errors to deal with heteroskedasticity. 
Table 1: Attention to the 2010 Campaign 
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of anger given efficacy and distribution of efficacy 
 
 
As the table and the plot of the marginal effect of anger given efficacy illustrate, anger about 
the economic crisis has diminished attention to politics during the 2010 campaign among individuals 
feeling inefficacious. This effect, which was the result of the interaction of anger with low efficacy, 
should not be underestimated, considering that almost 50% of the sample reported one of the two 
lowest levels of efficacy. This data also show that the vast majority of respondents in the survey feels 
inefficacious: is this a factor that shapes response to the crisis by mediating the effect of anger – as 
my hypothesis maintains – or is low efficacy a byproduct of the crisis? The panel nature of the BES 
dataset allows me to directly address these endogeneity concerns. A comparison of perceived efficacy 
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in the population before and during the crisis reveals that the distribution of efficacy has not changed 
substantially between 2005 and 2010. The proportions of respondents reporting levels of efficacy 
equal to 0 and 1 were .31 and .15 respectively in 2005 and .34 and .13 in 2010. This indicates that 
possible changes that may have happened at the individual level were not unidirectional. As a whole, 
the economic crisis does not seem to have decreased the level of efficacy in the population. Rather 
than being a by-product of the crisis, (in)efficacy emerges therefore as a factor mediating the response 
to the crisis.27  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of efficacy, before and during the crisis 
 
The analysis presented so far therefore confirms the first hypothesis: anger has decreased 
attention to politics among the very large sector of society with low efficacy. How can we account 
for this finding? I hypothesize that the effect of anger is mediated by the anger-induced political 
distrust, rather than reliance on habits and heuristics. Causal mediation analysis allows me to assess 
                                                          
27 Another way to deal with potential endogeneity could be to interact the level of efficacy expressed in 2005 with 
anger about the economic crisis, since this earlier measure of efficacy could not be affected by the crisis that unfolded 
later on. However, I rejected this alternative because it would yield even bigger problems. Indeed, in order to test my 
hypotheses and capture the effect of the interaction between anger and efficacy, I need to evaluate these two factors 
at the same point in time. As I warned above, changes in perceived efficacy at the individual level may have happened. 
Consider the scenario in which one citizen displayed a low level of efficacy in 2005 and became then more confident in 
her means to influence politics in 2010 after being promoting to a higher job position. If this citizen is angry about the 
financial crisis and I interact this expressed anger with her level of efficacy in 2005 I would measure the wrong effect. 
Instead of measuring the interaction displayed in 2010 (anger with high efficacy) I would measure the interaction 
between anger and low efficacy, whose effects are predicted to be opposite. 
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the suggested causal mechanism. I use the R mediation package developed by Tingley and others28 
and specify two models: the outcome model, which is the first model on attention to the 2010 
campaign presented in table 1, with the addition of the mediator trust; and the mediator model, in 
which the dependent variable is trust in politicians and the independent variables are the same as 
model 1. To account for the diversified effect of anger conditional on efficacy, I test the moderated 
mediation (captured by the interaction between trust and efficacy) and estimate the impact of the 
average causal mechanism (ACME) for citizens with the lowest level of efficacy. As the table shows, 
the ACME is statistically significant, but the average direct effect is not: these findings suggest that 
anger about the crisis has increased political distrust, which in turn has diminished attention to 
politics.29 The mediation analysis, therefore, supports the second hypothesis. 
 
Causal Mediation Analysis: Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals 
                    Estimate        95% CI Lower     95% CI Upper      p-value 
ACME               -0.0817                -0.1551               -0.0213               0.01 
ADE                 -0.2047                -0.4625                0.0545               0.14 
Total Effect       -0.2864                -0.5418               -0.0237               0.03 
Prop. Mediated       0.2796                  0.0445                1.6593               0.04 
 
Simulations: 1000 
Sample Size Used: 1330 
 
 The significant impact of anger on political attention suggests to also explore the effect of 
anger on political participation, which is evaluated through a logit model measuring the act of voting 
or not at the 2010 election. The main independent variable is still anger, also plugged into the model 
in interaction with efficacy, since I expect anger to depress participation among citizens with low 
                                                          
28 See mediation: R Package for Causal Mediation Analysis, http://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/mediation/mediation.pdf.  
29 The results of the causal mediation analysis are largely the same with a heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator 
(with robust standard errors) and with the nonparametric bootstrap. A caveat, however, must be raised about the 
results. Since the model-based inference in mediation analysis relies on the sequential ignorability assumption, 
sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess the possible existence of pre-treatment covariates and verify how much 
the key assumptions would need to be violated in order for the findings to go away. The analysis reveals that when ρ 
(i.e. the correlation between the residuals of the outcome and the mediator regression) equals .1, the confidence 
interval for ACME contains 0. For an explanation on sensitivity analysis, see Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010). 
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efficacy. To assess the robustness of the findings, two alternative operationalization of efficacy are 
adopted: efficacy is entered as either an 11-category variable or a binary variable measuring low and 
high efficacy. The controls can be grouped into 
the following sets. The first category includes 
socio-economic resources that can influence 
political participation: education, income, 
efficacy, age and age squared (see Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980). The second group focuses on 
the degree of individual social involvement and 
the potential effect of civic skills acquired 
outside of politics on political behavior (see 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995): home 
ownership and union membership. Third, the 
impact of mobilization on participation (see 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) is operationalized 
by party contact during the campaign. Fourth, 
following Valentino and co-authors (2011) in 
their assessment of the impact of emotions, I 
control for long-term political interest by 
including general interest, attention to politics 
and strength of partisan identification. 
Demographic controls for gender and race are 
also added. Finally, since voting may be habit 
forming and casting a ballot at one election may 
increase the likelihood to vote at the following 
ones (Gerber, Green and Shachar 2003), I 
Table 2: Participation:Vote 
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control for previous participation, which is possible given the panel character of the data. Vote in 
2005 and 2009, therefore, account for electoral participation before the crisis fully unfolded, thereby 
allowing me to analyze how anger about has modified citizens’ political engagement. 
The two models return similar results; since the AIC and BIC values are lower for the model 
with efficacy as a binary variable, the discussion focuses on this second model. Anger has decreased 
electoral participation for citizens who perceive a low personal influence on politics, which amount 
to about half of the sample. This is the specific effect of the interaction between anger and low 
efficacy, and not simply of the feeling of political inefficaciousness, as shown by the non-significance 
of the efficacy coefficient for citizens who did not express anger. In particular, controlling for the 
other covariates, the odds of voting for angry citizens with low efficacy are about 24 percentage points 
lower than the odds for non-angry individuals. Furthermore, many of the factors that capture long-
term resources and are usually associated with participation are not significant, inasmuch as their 
effect is likely captured by the variables controlling for vote in 2005 and 2009. Anger about the crisis, 
instead, has developed after the previous electoral appointments to modify political behavior. 
Taken together, the results of the models above on the effects of anger on political attention 
and participation tell a different story from what previous studies have usually narrated. Indeed, the 
literature has repeatedly maintained that anger produces a powerful mobilization effect. This study, 
instead, shows that the impact of anger is conditional on individual characteristics: anger about the 
economic crisis has had a powerful demobilizing effect for the half of citizens who do not believe 
they have the resources to influence politics.  
 
Anger and high efficacy 
The two models on participation above show that the interaction between anger and efficacy 
goes in the expected positive direction, thereby indicating that anger favors a greater political 
participation as efficacy increases. In the model with efficacy as a dummy, the anger coefficient is 
indeed positive for citizens with high efficacy. However, analysis on the marginal effect of anger on 
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interest given efficacy (not shown) reveals that the positive impact of anger for higher levels of 
efficacy is not statistically significant. These 
findings can be explained by the anger-induced 
distrust in political actors. As a vast literature on 
political trust has shown, and the causal mediation 
analysis above suggests, distrust may affect political 
participation (see Levi and Stoker 2000). Indeed, in 
the context of systemic anger and diffuse distrust, 
even citizens with more resources may lose 
confidence in the possibility of change if they 
perceive the system as a whole as untrustworthy. 
For this reason, in order to assess the impact of 
anger on participation for citizens who believe to 
possess the resources to influence politics, we need 
to control for the effect of political trust. Once we 
account for distrust towards political actors and the 
system as a whole, anger produces a positive impact 
on the likelihood of participation in the upper 
quartile of the population displaying the highest 
levels of efficacy. This suggests that the 
combination of anger and perceptions of political 
influence has provided citizens with the motivation 
and the resources that stimulate political engagement.30 The graphs below on the predicted probability 
                                                          
30 The models presented were run on the fourth quartile of citizens displaying the higher levels of efficacy. In the first 
model, the dependent variable is reported turnout, while the second model adopts intention to vote to allow a 
greater variance in the dependent variable. Given that these models focus only on citizens with high efficacy, no 
interaction between anger and efficacy is introduced. Since the number of observations is severely diminished, the 
Table 3: Participation: Vote and Intention to Vote 
(high efficacy) 
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of vote show how anger has depressed participation among citizens with low efficacy and promoted 
participation in combination with high efficacy. The impact of anger is evident across the three citizen 
profiles considered: an average non-partisan citizen, an habitual voter who has lost interest in politics, 
and an infrequent voter with low interest.  
Figure 5: Impact of anger on predicted probability of voting, low and high efficacy 
 
                                                          
control vote.2005 is eliminated in order to avoid the loss of even more observations; vote.2009 still control for 
previous patterns of participation (alternative models with vote.2005 produced similar results anyway). Two 
indicators measure distrust in the system: distrust in politicians and satisfaction with democracy. The models were 
also run plugging in the two controls for distrust separately and returned essentially similar results.  
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Support for Anti-Political Establishment Parties 
So far, this study has shown that anger has demobilized the half of the population who feels 
inefficacious about politics, and – after controlling for political distrust – favored greater engagement 
in the fourth of the population with the highest levels of efficacy. In order to understand the potential 
longer-term effects of anger on electoral behavior, we now need to explore the political preferences 
of angry citizens. To evaluate the impact of anger on political attitudes – and, specifically, support 
for APE parties – I analyze citizens’ opinions about the UKIP. Evaluations of the party, rather than 
just vote choice, allows me to assess the impact of anger on political preferences even for those 
citizens who did not cast a ballot, which would be excluded from an analysis purely based on electoral 
choice.31 Furthermore, looking at the potential support for APE parties beyond the electoral data is 
meaningful because favorable views towards anti-system parties, and specifically the UKIP, can 
concretely influence politics. As explained above, positive attitudes towards a party represent a pool 
of potential votes, which may translate into actual votes at a future point in time. Furthermore, a 
growing support for APE actors can convince mainstream parties to adopt some of the anti-system 
parties’ positions in order to retain voters, thereby promoting change within the system even outside 
the electoral channel.  
The models below, which measure opinions about the UKIP,32 control for variables that 
previous literature has shown to be positively correlated with support for populist, extremist and far-
right parties. These parties have usually scored better among men (Lubbers et al. 2002, Betz 1994). 
Younger and older voters tend also to be over-represented, either because of their greater reliance on 
                                                          
31 Indeed, models of electoral choice have sometimes used party evaluations as a mediator between the independent 
variable of interest and vote choice (for instance, see Markus and Converse 1979). In the context of the crisis, the 
analysis of the impact of anger on party evaluations is important because of the demobilizing effect of anger on 
citizens with low efficacy, who are less likely to vote. Models with vote choice as the dependent variable are anyway 
presented below. 
32 Opinions are measured on a scale ranging from 0 to 10. The table presents OLS models, estimated with robust 
standard errors to deal with heteroskedasticity.  All of the models were also run as ordered logit models and can be 
found in the appendix. The results remain unchanged. 
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welfare, which can lead to see immigrants as a threat, or because of their weaker social integration 
(see Arzheimer and Carter 2006). Less educated citizens, too, generally provide a greater support to 
extremist parties, either because of their more limited exposure to liberal values or on the basis of 
economic considerations: people with lower education generally have more limited job skills and may 
see immigrants as rivals (Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Weaklien 2002). I also control for the 
respondent’s working situation, since unemployed, manual workers, self-employed and small 
business owners have sometimes emerged as more likely supporters (Lubbers et al. 2002, Arzheimer 
and Carter 2006). Two indicators of social integration, i.e. home ownership and union membership, 
address theories of social disintegration, which claim that individuals at the margins of society are 
more likely to support extremist parties (Kornhauser 1960; see Evans 2005). In model three, political 
dissatisfaction and anti-immigrant views control for the attitudinal positions that often fuel the protest 
and far-right vote (Ignazi 1992, Lubbers and Scheepers 2000, Lubbers et al. 2000). Finally, in order 
to address endogeneity concerns in the relation between anger and support for the UKIP, the last 
model controls for people’s opinions about the UKIP in 2005. In this model, therefore, anger explains 
the change in opinions about the UKIP after the crisis unfolded. 
The results in the table below consistently show that anger has had a positive effect on support 
for the UKIP.33 The graphs below also illustrate how substantial this effect has been: the size of the 
impact of anger is comparable to the impact produced by moving from the lowest to the highest 
category of education; from the lowest level of satisfaction with democracy to the highest; and is not 
too distant from the impact of negative attitudes toward immigration, a very central topic in the UKIP 
political platform.34 Interestingly enough, after controlling for support for the UKIP in 2005, anger 
remains a significant predictor, while political dissatisfaction loses significance. This suggests that 
dissatisfaction with democracy already drove support for the UKIP in 2005, so that its effect is likely 
                                                          
33 The factor variable class includes 11 categories. The table reports only the statistically significant categories. The 
comparison baseline category is “professional or higher technical work.” 
34 In the graphs below, the y-axis shows support for the UKIP on a 0-10 scale, while the x-axis shows anger and the 
other covariates reported in model 3. 
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captured by the UKIP.05 control. Anger, instead, has emerged later on as a reaction to the economic 
crisis and helps explain the increase in support between 2005 and 2010. 
 
Table 4: Support for UKIP 
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Despite the good reasons to consider party evaluations rather than vote choice to investigate 
the effect of anger on support for APE parties, analyzing the electoral choice of angry citizens who 
did go to the polls allows me to explore additional points. First, I can assess whether anger, beyond 
affecting political preferences, has already influenced concrete actions. Second, a multinomial model 
makes possible an evaluation of support for the UKIP vis-à-vis other parties, by assessing whether 
anger has had an impact significant enough to not only improve opinions about the party, but also 
convince citizens to choose the UKIP over political alternatives. Since vote for the UKIP is the left-
out category in the model below, negative coefficients indicate an increase in the probability of voting 
for the UKIP over other parties. The controls include the predictors that resulted significant in model 
4 measuring support for the UKIP. Instead of opinions about the UKIP in 2005, a binary variable is 
introduced for citizens who voted for the party at the 2005 election.  
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Table 5: Party Choice at the 2010 Election 
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As expected, anger has increased the probability to vote for the UKIP over the Labour and the 
Liberal-Democratic party. Instead, in the sample including all citizens, anger does not seem to have 
had a significant impact on the choice of the UKIP over the Conservative Party. This finding may be 
explained by the British electoral system and the ideology of the two parties. Single-member plurality 
electoral systems tend to favor bigger parties over smaller ones that stand little chance to win the 
district. Furthermore, despite the fact that the UKIP brands itself as the real opposition against all 
traditional parties, the Conservatives and the UKIP do share some common positions. They both 
occupy the right side of the political spectrum and have adopted a critical stance, even if with different 
tones, over British membership in the EU (Abedi and Lundberg 2009) and immigration.35 As a 
consequence, some angry citizens considering the UKIP as their preferred option may have 
strategically voted for the closest alternative that stood more chances to win the district seat.36 This 
likely applies especially to angry citizens with high efficacy, who – believing that they have the 
resources to influence politics – may have been more reluctant to choose an anti-system alternative.   
In fact, things change when we consider the subset of angry citizens with low efficacy:37 these 
voters were more likely to choose the UKIP even over the Conservative Party (see table).38 This 
suggests that angry citizens with high efficacy sometimes looked for change within the system and 
opted for an anti-incumbent strategy. Angry citizens feeling inefficacious, instead, grew alienated 
from the traditional political landscape and became more sensitive to anti-system messages. Feeling 
they had little influence over a disliked system, these citizens convincingly supported the party that 
                                                          
35 More recently, the Conservative Party has proposed a restrictive immigration reform. See for instance: “The Tories 
are becoming the 'nasty party' on immigration” (The Guardian, 10 June 2012) and “The Tories’ barmiest policy” (The 
Economist, 20 October 2012). 
36 Recent electoral data from the UK suggest that the electoral system can make a big difference in the electoral 
results of anti-mainstream parties. As mentioned above, the UKIP obtained 2.3% and 3.1% of the vote at the last two 
national elections held with a plurality electoral system, while it was able to gain more than 16% of the vote at the last 
two elections for the European Parliament, which are conducted under a PR system. Furthermore, identification with 
the Conservative Party is correlated with a more positive view of the UKIP; analogously, identification with the UKIP is 
positively correlated with more positive opinions on the Conservative Party (analysis not shown). 
37 As illustrated above, citizens with the lowest level of efficacy constitutes about one third of the sample. 
38 The table represents the multinomial model discussed above with the same controls, now run only on the subset of 
citizens with the lowest level of efficacy. The control variables are not reported in the table. A table with all the 
covariates can be found in the appendix. 
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represented the biggest challenge to the system itself. The importance of the interaction between anger 
and low efficacy in predicting support for the UKIP is also shown by the graph below illustrating the 
predicted probability of voting for the UKIP (black).39 Levels of efficacy are plotted on the x-axis, 
while the two columns represent non-angry and angry citizens, respectively. In the absence of anger, 
efficacy does not seem to have a substantial effect on vote for the UKIP. Among angry citizens, 
instead, the predicted probability of voting for the UKIP is significantly higher among citizens with 
low efficacy (around 8%) than citizens with high efficacy (around 1%). 
 
Table 6: Party Choice at the 2010 Election (low efficacy) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
39 The predicted probability derives from the multinomial model where possible party choices are UKIP, Labour, 
Conservative, and Lib-Dem. 
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Further analysis on attitudes towards the UKIP, expressed by respondents’ opinions on the 
party, confirms the greater support for the UKIP among angry citizens with low efficacy. Indeed, the 
anger coefficient size is bigger for the subset of citizens with low efficacy: in the four models on 
support for the UKIP, the coefficients are 1.58, 1.62, 1.06 and 0.47, respectively, as compared to 1.09, 
1.08, 0.72 and 0.28 in table 4 above considering all citizens.40 Additionally, the graphs depicting the 
impact of anger across the 11 categories of efficacy show how anger always has a positive impact on 
support for the UKIP, but its effect declines as efficacy increases and becomes statistically non-
significant for very high levels of efficacy. 
 
Effect of anger on support for UKIP across different levels of efficacy 
 
 
Anger about the economic crisis, therefore, has increased support for the UKIP, especially 
among citizens with low efficacy. Causal mediation analysis helps evaluate whether the two 
                                                          
40 A table on support for UKIP among citizens with low efficacy can be found in the appendix. 
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mechanisms proposed above, i.e. increased risk propensity and refusal to compromise, explain the 
greater support for APE parties. Risky choices and rejection of compromise are prompted by desire 
for fundamental change. The causal mediation analysis, therefore, evaluates whether anger has led 
citizens to perceive the UKIP as a possibility of fundamental change and, consequently, to vote for 
the party.41 In the R mediation package, the dependent variable of the mediation model is perceptions 
of the UKIP as a possibility of change. In the outcome model, the binary dependent variable measures 
vote for the UKIP and the controls are the same as the ones adopted in the multinomial model on 
party choice, in addition to the mediator. The analysis clearly shows the significance of the proposed 
causal mechanism (and the non-significance of the direct effects): anger has increased the perception 
of the UKIP as a possibility of change, which, in turn, has led to vote for the UKIP.42 
 
Causal Mediation Analysis: Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals 
                            Estimate       95% CI Lower       95% CI Upper      p-value 
ACME (control)               0.01337               0.00318               0.02600               0.01 
ACME (treated)               0.01238               0.00310               0.02351     0.01 
ADE (control)              -0.00682          -0.02886               0.01432      0.51 
ADE (treated)              -0.00781        -0.03344               0.01580     0.51 
Total Effect                 0.00556         -0.01896               0.02902     0.63 
Prop. Mediated (control)     0.79800        -12.24256            14.92464     0.62 
Prop. Mediated (treated)    0.82392        -10.33103            14.13113      0.62 
ACME (average)              0.01288           0.00321               0.02447     0.01 
ADE (average)              -0.00732         -0.03078              0.01482     0.51 
Prop. Mediated (average)     0.81096       -11.46419            14.43416      0.62 
 
Simulations: 1000 
Sample Size Used: 1603 
 
 
                                                          
41 An anti-incumbent vote is often stimulated by desire for change. What the causal mediation analysis here presented 
is testing, however, is not just the importance of change in vote choice. Instead, it is testing whether anger about the 
economic crisis leads citizens to perceive an APE party as a possibility of systemic change and convinces them to vote 
for the party because of that reason.   
42 Results of the causal mediation analysis remain unchanged when robust standard errors or bootstrap are adopted. 
The causal mediation analysis was also run with an outcome model in which the ordered dependent variable 
measures opinions about the UKIP and the controls are the same as the ones in model 3 on support for the UKIP. 
Results remain largely unchanged. In that case, the sensitivity analysis for the average causal mechanism shows that 
the confidence interval for ACME contains 0 when ρ (i.e. the correlation between the residuals of the outcome and 
the mediator regression) equals 0.6 and 0.7.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
As this study has shown, anger about the economic crisis has produced diversified political 
effects. Anger has decreased political attention and participation among citizens with low efficacy 
and promoted greater participation among citizens with higher efficacy. These results therefore shed 
new light on the link between anger and political involvement: while the literature has consistently 
reported an unconditional mobilizing effect, this study shows that the nature of anger – systemic in 
the context of the crisis – and individual variation in terms of perceived political resources account 
for more nuanced outcomes. In the context of the crisis, the depressing effect on political participation 
among citizens with low efficacy has a substantial interest, considering that a very large sector of 
society currently perceives an extremely low level of personal influence over politics. These findings 
may apply beyond the economic crisis to cases of diffuse anger and blame attribution. 
Besides affecting political engagement, anger about the crisis has also increased support for 
anti-establishment political parties, especially among citizens with low efficacy. The support that 
APE parties enjoy among angry citizens is mainly due to their unwillingness to compromise and 
collaborate with other political forces, and to their promise to bring substantial changes to the status 
quo, which resonates well with the more risk-prone angry citizens. The latent support for anti-system 
forces should not be underestimated: citizens expressing favorable opinions on APE parties who are 
currently demobilized still constitute a pool of potential future voters. The increase in consensus of 
previously marginalized forces may work as a self-fulfilling prophecy, presenting those forces as 
electorally credible contenders, thereby solving collective action problems and convincing currently 
demobilized citizens to return to the polls. Indeed, the increasing success of anti-system parties in 
more recent European elections seems to point in this direction. Future studies should therefore 
examine how long-lasting the anger-induced effects are likely to be. Will citizens angry about the 
crisis withdraw their support for anti-system forces after the exit from the crisis, or are they 
developing political attachments that will be carried on in the future? Answering these questions 
seems an endeavor worth pursuing in times of still very high economic and political uncertainty.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Distribution of the dependent variable measuring attention to the 2010 election campaign 
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Table - 1: Attention to Campaign (without Interest) 
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Table - 2: Attention to Campaign (Ordered Logit) 
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Table - 3: Support for UKIP (Ordered Logit) 
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Table - 4: Party choice at the election: low efficacy 
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Table - 5: Support for UKIP: low efficacy 
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List of survey questions 
 
 
Anger about the financial crisis 
 
“Which, if any of the following words describe your feelings about how you have been personally 
affected by the current financial crisis?” (Anger was one of the 8 possible answers) 
 
Attention to the 2010 campaign 
 
“Using a 0 to 10 scale where 0 means no attention and 10 means a great a deal of attention, how much 
attention have you paid to the general election campaign thus far?” 
 
Efficacy 
 
“On a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how 
much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?” 
 
Interest in politics 
 
“Let’s talk for a few minutes about politics in general. How much interest do you generally have in 
what is going on in politics?” (5 categories, from “none at all” to “a great deal”) 
 
General attention to politics  
 
 “On a scale of 0 to 10, how much attention do you generally pay to politics?” 
 
Vote 
 
“Talking to people about the General Election on May 6th, we have found that a lot of people didn’t 
manage to vote. How about you – did you manage to vote in the General Election?” 
 
UKIP (opinion) 
 
“On a scale that runs from 0 to 10, where 0 means strongly dislike and 10 means strongly like, how 
do you feel about the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)?” 
